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Abstract 
 
We investigated the relationship between different kinds of target reports in a rapid serial visual 
presentation task, and their associated perceptual experience. Participants reported the identity of 
two targets embedded in a stream of stimuli and their associated subjective visibility. In our task, 
target stimuli could be combined together to form more complex ones, thus allowing participants to 
report temporally integrated percepts. We found that integrated percepts were associated with high 
subjective visibility scores, whereas reports in which the order of targets was reversed led to a poor-
er perceptual experience. We also found a reciprocal relationship between the chance of the second 
target not being reported correctly and the perceptual experience associated with the first one. Prin-
cipally, our results indicate that integrated percepts are experienced as a unique, clear perceptual 
event, whereas order reversals are experienced as confused, similar to cases in which an entirely 
wrong response was given.  
 
Keywords: temporal integration, perceptual awareness, subjective visibility, order errors, RSVP. 
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1. Introduction 
Our ability to attend to objects and events in the environment is not limitless. One well-known 
attentional constraint is demonstrated by the attentional blink (AB) phenomenon, which is the 
difficulty associated with identifying the second of two target stimuli when they arrive within about 
half a second from each other (Broadbent & Broadbent, 1987; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992). 
Somewhat paradoxically, however, the AB often does not seem to take effect immediately: when 
targets follow each other directly, without intervening distractors, in the so-called Lag 1 condition, 
target identification can be very high (Visser, Bischof, & Di Lollo, 1999). Such cases thus seem to 
afford an escape from the AB, even though the time to process both targets at Lag 1 is the most 
limited. 
 It has also been observed, however, that the high rate of target identification at Lag 1 
does not come without costs. In particular, the order in which targets appeared seems to be 
frequently lost. Instead of reporting the targets in their proper order, observers often reverse them, 
committing an “order reversal” (or “swap”) error. The loss of order information at Lag 1 supports 
the idea that the targets are temporally integrated into a single episodic event (trace), within which 
target-specific timestamps are unavailable (Hommel & Akyürek, 2005). This has been modelled 
formally in the Simultaneous Type/ Serial Token (STST) model by Bowman and Wyble (2007), in 
which an incorrect binding of target identities, or types, and episodic events, or tokens, can occur.  
 The STST model provides a theory of temporal attention and working memory (Bowman 
& Wyble, 2007). It gives a comprehensive account of the attentional blink phenomenon and 
associated effects (Bowman & Wyble, 2007; Wyble et al, 2009). The model has two versions – the 
original STST model (Bowman & Wyble, 2007) and the episodic STST (eSTST) model (Wyble et 
al, 2009). Central to both STST models is the idea that perceptual processing has two stages (Chun 
& Potter, 1995). The first of these performs object detection, providing, in the terminology of the 
model, representations of types, i.e. activation of neural assemblies defining what a presented 
stimulus is. In the second stage, active types are associated with active tokens, see figure 1. Tokens 
represent when a stimulus / type occurred. Thus, the presentation of the symbol “O” in one of our 
experiments would cause its corresponding type to become active, which in turn would be 
associated with a token indicating when it occurred relative to other types, see figure 1, again. It is 
this second stage – the association of types with tokens – that is relevant to this paper. 
 We will focus here on the STST model rather than eSTST. This is because its notion of 
token is more in keeping with the sort of integrations we will be considering in this paper. More 
specifically, the notion of token changes somewhat between STST and eSTST. In the latter model, 
each type has its own unique token, and the time point at which a type is registered to have occurred 
(relative to other types) is determined by the time-point at which its token commits. It is not so clear 
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how this eSTST model would generate combined percepts, as arise when integration errors are 
made. However, STST relatively naturally models such integrations, as described shortly. 
 In STST, it is frequently the case that at Lag 1, both targets (in fact, strictly their types) 
are bound into a single token. This corresponds to a complete loss of order information while 
combining the targets’ identities, i.e., integration into a single episode. In fact, there are four kinds 
of encoding outcome that can arise from the STST model when presented with a Lag 1 sequence 
(Fig. 1). Which of these the model generates depends upon the relative input strength of the two 
target types: perfect performance (Panel A), in which tokens are correctly associated with types, 
i.e., according to the stimulus presentation stream; pure order error (Panel B), in which tokens are 
associated in the wrong order, but without an ambiguity, so that no trace is left to indicate that this 
is a mis-binding; impure order error (Panel C), in which one type has its binding smeared across 
two tokens, which yields another order error; and single episode (Panel D), in which both types are 
associated with the first token and none with the second. In the standard dual target RSVP 
paradigms, in which targets remain uniquely reportable items, observers may have to guess more or 
less blindly at their order, when faced with the single episode outcome. However, in a paradigm 
such as that in this paper (detailed below), an integrated target report would be expected to arise in 
this case. 
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Figure 1. Potential encoding outcomes arising from the STST model when presented with a Lag 1 
sequence. D denotes an arbitrary distractor; TyK type K; and Toh token h. There are four potential 
binding outcomes that the model can generate: A) perfect performance; B) pure order error, C) 
impure order error, and D) single episode. B) and C) may be viewed as forms of prior entry. 
 
 Confirmatory evidence for temporal target integration was recently obtained by Akyürek 
and colleagues (2012), by using a target set that enabled not only individual report of targets, but 
also of combined pairs. In one experiment, for instance, symbols that looked like “\”, “/”, and “X” 
were part of the set; the integration of the first two results in the third, which itself is a valid target 
identity. With such targets, at Lag 1, observers indeed frequently reported seeing only a single 
target stimulus, merging the features of the first and second target (T1 and T2). Moreover, these 
reports occurred up to approximately three times as often as (real) order reversals, which also still 
occurred. 
 Losing some order sensitivity due to temporal integration, in exchange for featural 
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precision and for escaping the AB, may seem like a modest price to pay. Indeed, in most natural 
perceptual tasks, there are likely to be few instances in which it would be preferable to discern ~80 
ms intervals from one another, over perceiving longer, aggregated events, which likely contain 
more meaningful information. However, it is important to determine whether there are further 
hidden costs to such integration. It is conceivable that the integrated representation of two targets is 
more fragile, less clear, or even less precise than that of two separate targets that were successfully 
perceived. For instance, within one event, the aggregate featural information from multiple stimuli 
might cause more confusion, or even risk overloading the perceptual system. Targets might also 
compete with each other more strongly once they are part of the same event (Hommel & Akyürek, 
2005). 
In the RSVP tasks used to date, such detrimental effects may go unnoticed, because the 
report that is asked of the participants does not directly probe the clarity of the resulting 
representations, and the observers might succeed in reporting the target features themselves because 
these do not require fine discriminations. There is one study to date that has looked at pupil dilation 
associated with target report accuracy, which may shed some light on this issue. Wolff and 
colleagues (2015) examined pupil dilation as a measure of mental effort, dependent on the different 
types of report that their observers made. Pupil dilations associated with correct reports of two 
targets, of one target, and integration reports were contrasted. The authors found that pupil dilation 
(and thus, it would be expected, mental effort) was lowest for single target and integration reports, 
while two-target reports resulted in increased dilation. It is tempting to conclude that integration, 
which comprises all features of both targets, affords the processing of two targets at the price of 
one. Yet, although this may be true for mental effort, it is not clear whether perceptual clarity was 
not impaired, even if still good enough for behavioural report; in this sense the study only provides 
corroborative evidence. 
 The present study sought to resolve the issue of perceptual clarity during temporal 
integration. One way to address this might be to require such fine featural discriminations that slight 
losses might be detectable when integration and individual target reports are compared. However, 
this approach runs into practical problems; pilot experiments showed that target identification rates 
tend to drop off steeply in such designs, even when targets consisted of just 6 possible visual 
features. Fortunately, there is an established method by which the perceptual experience can be 
probed: the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), proposed by Overgaard et al. (2006). This scale 
allows participants to report directly what they experience, rather than report only about stimulus 
features. Overgaard et al. (2006) argued that correct reports about stimulus features can be 
dissociated from reports about experience, effectively allowing study of the contents of conscious 
experience. In the present study, the PAS was combined with the proven RSVP integration 
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procedure used in Akyürek et al. (2012), so that perceptual awareness associated with behavioural 
reports of single targets, dual targets, and integrations can be compared. Furthermore, dual target 
reports can subsequently be divided into order-correct and order-incorrect (real order reversal) 
reports, which provide a measure of differences in perceptual awareness due to the loss of order 
information, apart from temporal integration.  
 Another important point that could be addressed with such a procedure is the relationship 
between the process of target consolidation in memory and its perceptual experience. In fact, most 
theories of consciousness consider the representations in working memory as the only ones 
available for conscious report. They also support the views that the consolidation of a representation 
means that it has been consciously perceived and that conscious access is based upon the material 
consolidated into working memory (Baars & Franklin, 2003; Block, 2007; Lamme, 2006). 
Accordingly, AB studies often consider working memory consolidation and conscious access of 
information to be overlapping, indeed often identical, processes (Nieuwenhuis & de Kleijn, 2011; 
Sergent & Dehaene, 2004; but see Pincham, Bowman, & Szucs, 2016). Interestingly, most neural 
models of the AB attribute the lack of consciousness or the poor conscious experience associated 
with the second target to the dynamics of consolidation into memory, but some of them claim that a 
target is ‘protected’ from the influence of another incoming target, during its consolidation into 
memory (Craston, Wyble, Chennu, & Bowman, 2009; Simione et al., 2012). We would thus also 
like to assess if the processes of perceiving and consolidating the second target vary with the 
conscious experience associated with the first target. 
 
2. Materials and methods 
2.1. Participants 
Twenty volunteers (15 females; Mean age=24.75, Range=22-30) from “Sapienza”, University of 
Rome, took part in the experiment. We removed one participant from the analysis because of a 
technical problem. The final data set included 19 participants (14 females; Mean age=24.71, 
Range=22-30). Al participants gave informed consent in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki after verbal and written explanation of the procedures involved in the study. 
 
2.2. Materials 
The targets consisted of all possible combinations of the capital letter O and the forward and 
backward slash (“/” and “\”) symbols, as shown in Figure 2. These were coloured in blue. The 
targets were chosen in such a way that their features did not overlap with each other (i.e., the same 
line or the O was never shown for both T1 and T2), for a total of 12 possible T1-T2 combinations, 
excluding the target with all the features (top left in the inset in Figure 2), which can only be 
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presented alone (in single target trials). 
 Distractor stimuli consisted of capital letters, presented in 52-point, bold Courier New 
font. They were drawn randomly without replacement from the full alphabet for each trial. To avoid 
confusion with the targets, the letters O and X were removed from the distractor set. The fixation 
cross consisted of a small plus sign (“+”). 
 
 
Figure 2. The experimental procedure. Dashed frames represent sequences of un-depicted 
distractors. At the end of each visual stream (trial), the participants had to report the identity of the 
perceived targets and their related experience was assessed with a modified version of the PAS 
scale. The box in the upper right corner shows the seven possible target symbols. 
 
 The four points of the original PAS from Overgaard et al. (2006) were formatted to fit 
our experiment. In particular, the PAS usually refers to a single-stimulus presentation, whereas in 
our experiment multiple stimuli were presented in each trial. So, we replaced all the references to 
“the stimulus” presented in the original PAS with a more specific reference to “the target” 
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previously reported. Our PAS version was as follows: 
1. No experience. No impression of the target is experienced. The answer is experienced as 
mere guessing. 
2. Fleeting experience. A feeling that the target was present, even though the target cannot be 
specified any further. 
3. Almost clear experience. Feeling of having seen the target, but not being sure about its 
identity. 
4. Clear experience. Non-ambiguous experience of the target. 
 
2.3. Procedure  
Each trial started with the presentation of the fixation cross for 200 ms after 100 ms of a blank 
screen with a grey background. Then the RSVP sequence of 15 stimuli started. Each stimulus was 
presented for 70 ms and followed by a 10 ms blank screen (80 ms SOA). On most trials, two of 
these stimuli were targets (i.e., T1 and T2), while the others were distractors. Targets were depicted 
in blue, while distractors were in black. T1 appeared as either the 5th or the 7th item in the stream 
and T2 followed T1 with 0, 2, or 7 distractors in-between (lag 1, 3, or 8). There was no T2 on a 
small portion of trials (5.2%), in which it was replaced with a distractor. These trials were excluded 
from analysis. The participants’ task was to identify the targets at the end of the stream, after a 100 
ms blank delay, by entering the identity of T1 and then that of T2. Participants entered the target 
identity by pressing one out of seven keys on a computer keyboard. Each key was associated with a 
single possible identity as indicated by a label applied on it. Participants had to mandatorily report 
T1 but they could skip the report of T2 by pressing the spacebar, if they saw only one target in the 
stream. Participants were encouraged to guess in case of doubt. 
 After reporting each target, participants had to rate their subjective experience of that 
target, by pressing a key from 1 to 4 corresponding to the points of the PAS scale, which were 
displayed on the screen with the corresponding labels.  
 The experiment included a total of 608 experimental trials (12 possible T1-T2 
combinations X 3 lags X 16 trials for each combination + 32 single-target trials) randomized in two 
blocks of 304 trials. A short practice block including 20 trials, which was also excluded from 
analysis, preceded the experimental trials. The experimental session lasted for about 60 minutes. 
 
2.4. Experimental design and statistical analyses 
Analyses were performed on T1 and T2|T1 accuracy as well as on the associated mean PAS scores. 
For accuracy, we scored differently the identity of the report, i.e. the matching between the reported 
identity and the presented targets, and the order of the report, i.e. the correct sequence in which 
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targets have been presented. Thus we can have a target reported correctly in its identity but in the 
wrong order, e.g., a T1 reported as T2. By combining all the reporting condition, we can have both 
targets reported correctly in identity and order, both targets reported correctly in identity but in the 
wrong order, only one target reported correctly in identity but necessarily in order, or both targets 
reported incorrectly in identity and order. A special condition is the report of an integrated percept: 
we scored a response as integration if participants reported the presence of only one target and the 
reported identity was equal to the combination of the two targets presented.  
As we obtained a different number of trials per condition for each participant, as well as 
participants who reported no integrated response at all, we used linear-mixed effects models (Bates, 
Maechler, & Bolker, 2012) instead of the usual ANOVAs. This is because they compensate for trial 
number fluctuations and are more robust for quasi-experimental designs, so they can deal better 
with unequal numbers of cases. First, analyses were conducted with the dependent variables of the 
report accuracy of target identity or of both target identities and order, assessing the contribution of 
the fixed effects of lag and of report type. Then, we assessed the contribution of the fixed effects of 
both lag and of the type of error report (reversal vs. integration) on the dependent variable of the 
relative frequency of reversals and integrations. We also assessed the contribution of the fixed 
effects of relative PAS score on the report accuracy as dependent variable and the contribution of 
the fixed effects of trial report type (see next Section for details) on the PAS score related to the 
first or to the second target reported as dependent variables. Lastly, we assessed the contribution of 
the fixed effects of the correctness of the second target reported on the PAS score related to the first 
target reported, included as dependent variable. As random effects, participant and trial repetition 
random slopes were included in all the models. For each fixed effect, we will report estimated 
coefficients and standard errors, and the associated t-value. As suggested by Bates et al. (2012), p-
values were obtained where possible by likelihood-ratio tests of the full model against the model 
without the effect in question. 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Accuracy data 
As a first analysis, we tested the main and interaction effects of Lag and report type (identity only, 
or identity and order) on the mean accuracy of T1 and on the mean accuracy of T2|T1 (Figure 3, left 
panel). For the T1 accuracy, the analysis revealed that both the Lag (β = 0.015, SE = 0.0035, t = 
4.42, χ2(1) = 39.91, p<.001) and the report type (β = -0.353, SE = 0.008, t = -40,44, χ2(1) = 
1505.4, p<.001) affected the T1 accuracy. Also the interaction between the two fixed effects 
influenced T1 accuracy significantly (β = 0.037, SE = 0.002, t = 21.01, χ2(1) = 437.63, p<.001). In 
fact, we obtained considerably higher performance at Lag 1 when order was ignored (i.e. the T1i 
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curve). For the T2|T1 accuracy, the analysis revealed that this variable was not influenced by Lag (β 
= -0.006, SE = 0.006, t = -0.859, χ2(1) = 0.801, p=.37), but was by report type (β = -0.24, SE = 
0.01, t = -17.47, χ2(1) = 170.5, p<.001), as well as by the interaction between these two factors (β = 
0.03, SE = 0.002, t = 12.38, χ2(1) = 152.35, p<.001), due again to higher performance at Lag 1 
when order was ignored. 
 After these first analyses on T1 and T2|T1 accuracy, we analysed the frequencies of 
reversal and integrated responses in the trials in which both the two target identities were reported 
correctly, with the relative frequencies of error in report as dependent variable. In particular, we 
assessed if lag has an effect on this dependent variable, that is, on the frequency of reversals and 
integrations. As shown in Figure 3, right panel, Lag did not affect the frequency of trials in which 
participants reported a reversal (β = -0.005, SE = 0.003, t = -1.49, χ2(1) = 2.11, p=.11) but it 
significantly affected the frequency of trials in which participants reported an integrated target (β = 
-0.07, SE = 0.009, t = -8.1, χ2(1) = 31.59, p<.001), causing a decrease in the frequency of 
integrated percepts as Lag increased.  
 
Figure 3. Left panel, average accuracy in different reporting conditions, identity only correct (i) or 
both identity and order correct (io), as a function of Lag, for T1 and T2|T1. Please note that in both 
integrations and reversals, identities of the two targets were considered as correctly reported. Right 
panel, average relative frequencies of integrations and reversals as function of Lag. Error bars 
display standard errors. 
 
3.2. Perceptual awareness data 
With regard to the PAS scores, we conducted a first analysis on the target accuracy related to the 
first (R1) and second (R2) response and with different reported perceptual experience. We collapsed 
 12 
the accuracy data across lag for this analysis. This involved comparing for each dependent variable 
(accuracy on R1 and accuracy on R2), a model with the fixed effect of the reported PAS score 
corresponding to R1 and R2, with a model without this fixed effect (Fig. 4). The first PAS score 
reported varied with the R1 accuracy (β = 9.99, SE = 0.49, t = 20.5, χ2(1) = 411.79, p<.001), with 
accuracy increasing as the PAS score increased. The same effect was present for the R2 accuracy, 
which varied similarly with the PAS score reported on R2 (β = 10.11, SE = 0.52, t = 19.38, χ2(1) = 
362.18, p<.001). 
 
Figure 4. Average accuracy as a function of the PAS score for both the first and the second target 
reported. Error bars display standard errors. 
 
 As explained in the Introduction, we were mainly interested in assessing if reversal and 
integration events lead to clearer or poorer perceptual experiences with respect to other reporting 
conditions. To this end, we compared the reported perceptual awareness in those trials (reversal, R, 
and integration, I) with that reported in three other conditions: i) with both targets’ identity and 
order reported wrongly (both wrong, BW); ii) with only one target identity reported correctly 
(single correct, SC); and iii) with both targets’ identity and order reported correctly (both correct, 
BC). Table 1 summarizes the average number of different reports we found in our data. In 
particular, we averaged the PAS score associated with R1 and R2 in all these conditions, with the 
exception of the integration, in which only the PAS score of R1 was considered (for which, by 
definition, no R2 was given). Again, we collapsed the data across lag for this analysis. Figure 5 
reports the average values computed for each condition. Please note that, for this as well as for the 
following analyses, the match between box-plots in figures and reported statistics is not perfect. 
This is because a mixed-effects analysis contains trial-level regressors (fixed effects) and 
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participant-level regressors (random effects), and the inferred coefficients are influenced by both 
these levels. For consistency with previous publications, figures show participant-level 
distributions, while reporting means computed over all of the trials (as dots inside the boxes). 
 
 
 
 To assess if the PAS score associated with the I and R trials was different, for each of the 
other conditions, we computed a full model including the PAS score obtained in that “other” 
condition and in the I and R conditions, which together comprise the dependent variable. Then, as 
independent variables we included the fixed effect of I and R conditions, and the random effects of 
participants and trial repetitions. In this model, the “other” condition gives the intercept. Then, we 
compared each full model with the other two models in which we removed the effects of I and then 
R, respectively. In this manner, we could estimate if I and R events led to different or similar PAS 
scores with respect to the other considered conditions, by analysing the way in which the I and R 
conditions affected the model fitting. Finally, we contrasted directly I and R conditions by 
comparing a full model with both conditions with a model without one of the two. We summarized 
these analyses in Table 2, where (significance test) p-values of effects discussed below are shown. 
 The analysis revealed that in both I and R trials, participants reported higher PAS scores 
than in BW trials (β=0.58 and β=0.2, respectively). Instead, with reference to the SC trials, 
participants reported significantly higher PAS scores in I trials (β=0.42) but similar PAS scores in R 
trials (β=0.04), and with reference to the BC trials, participants reported significantly lower PAS 
scores in R trials (β=-0.43) but similar PAS scores in I trials (β=-0.005). In summary, this analysis 
showed that I and R trials, in which at least targets’ identity was correctly reported, led to a clearer 
perceptual experience than the worst case, i.e., BW trials, in which the identity of both targets was 
wrong. Instead, the PAS score associated with the trials in which the identity of only one target was 
correct was similar to the PAS score associated with R trials and lower than that associated with I 
trials. Lastly, the PAS score associated with trials in which the identity and order of both targets 
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were reported correctly (BC) was higher than the PAS score associated with the R trials but similar 
to that associated with the I trials. Consistent with the results reported so far, comparing directly the 
PAS score associated with I and R trials revealed significantly higher PAS score in I trials (β=0.37). 
 
 
Figure 5. Box plot of PAS scores in different report conditions. The black dots represent mean 
values. The grey dots represent outlier values. BW=both wrong; R=reversal; SC=single correct; 
I=integration; BC=both correct. 
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 To assess the influence of Lag on the effects found, we conducted three further analyses. 
We simply applied the same pattern of analysis previously reported, but we included only the trials 
of a single lag: 1, 3, and 8 respectively (Fig. 6). We summarized all the results of these analyses in 
Table 3, including (significance test) p-values. With respect to Lag 1 (see Fig. 6, left), the PAS 
score in I trials was higher than that in all other conditions (β=0.65, β=0.39, and β=0.78 for the 
comparison with SC, BC, and BW trials respectively), whereas in R trials the PAS score was lower 
than that associated with BC trials (β=-0.26) and similar to that associated with SC (β=0.03) and 
BW (β=0.08) trials. With respect to Lag 3 (see Fig. 6, middle), the PAS score associated with the 
SC trials was lower than that associated with I trials (β=0.24) but similar to that associated with R 
trials (β=0.06), and a reverse pattern of results applies to the BC trials, with PAS score similar to the 
I and higher than that in the R trials (β=-0.08 and β=-0.3, respectively for I and R trials). Then, the 
PAS associated with BW trials was lower than that associated with both I and R trials (β=0.41 and 
β=0.28, respectively). Finally, with respect to Lag 8 (see Fig. 6, right) the PAS score associated 
with I and R trials was lower than that associated with BC trials (β-0.5 and β=-0.18), whereas PAS 
for I trials was similar to both SC and BW trials (β=-0.06 and β=0.04) and PAS for R trials was 
higher than both SC and BW trials (β=0.2 and β=0.25). Again, we compared directly the PAS score 
associated with I and R trials, and we found that it was higher in I trials at Lag 1 (β=0.53) but 
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similar at Lag 3 (β=0.17) and Lag 8 (β=-0.25). 
 
 
Figure 6. Box plot of PAS score in different report conditions, divided by Lag. The black dots 
represent the mean values. The grey dots represent outlier values. BW=both wrong; R=reversal; 
SC=single correct; I=integration; BC=both correct. 
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 Finally, we analysed the contribution of R2 accuracy to the PAS score reported for R1 
(Fig. 7). In particular, we computed a mixed effects model on the PAS score related to R1 (which 
gives the dependent variable), with the random effect of participants and the fixed effect of R2 
correctness. We repeated this analysis for each Lag. We found that the R1-related PAS score was 
significantly affected by the correctness of R2 report, with higher PAS score for R1 when R2 report 
was correct at Lag 1, β=0.15, SE=0.06, t=2.6, p<.05, at Lag 3, β=0.26, SE=0.05, t=4.72, p<.001, 
as well as at Lag 8, β=0.25, SE=0.04, t=6.79, p<.001. Please note that, even if the effect was 
present for all the three lags, it was more pronounced at Lag 3 and 8, β=0.26 and β=0.25 
respectively, than at Lag 1, β=0.15, 
 
 
Figure 7. Box plot of PAS score reported on R1 in different R2 report conditions, separated by Lag. 
The black dots represent the mean values. 
 
4. Discussion 
In this paper, we investigated how different kinds of target report conditions influenced the 
perceptual awareness of two consecutive targets embedded in a stream of stimuli. To this end, we 
asked participants to report both the identity of the two targets and the perceptual awareness 
associated with each target on a modified version of the PAS scale (Overgaard et al., 2006). To 
allow the report of integrated percepts that included all features of both the first and the second 
target, we used stimuli that could potentially be combined together to form a more complex one 
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(Akyürek et al., 2012). We found that participants often reported integrated percepts at Lag 1 and 
that the perceptual awareness associated with such integrated events was even higher than that 
associated with fully correct responses. On the contrary, when the two targets were reported in the 
wrong order (partial or complete reversals), the associated PAS score was at the level of that 
associated with the completely wrong responses. Overall, our results show that integrated percepts 
are experienced as a unique, clear perceptual event, whereas the reversals are experienced as 
confused or not clear, similar to cases in which an entirely wrong response was given. 
This outcome supports the idea that temporal target integration not only requires 
comparatively low mental effort (Wolff et al., 2015), but also results in a clear representation, close 
to (and at Lag 1 in fact stronger than) that of a pair of correctly perceived and ordered individual 
targets. It is thus unlikely that the quality of the featural representations is negatively affected by 
integration, as might be expected if mutual target competition would have become more intense as a 
consequence thereof. Instead, the idea that integration and competition may be the extremes of a 
perceptual processing spectrum (Hommel & Akyürek, 2005) is more compatible with the present 
findings. 
 It may be noted also that the apparent absence of competition between targets in the 
present study was obtained with stimuli that do not necessarily match well together, or form a 
particularly coherent form (i.e., a Gestalt), such as have been used in some versions of the current 
task (cf. Experiment 1 of Akyürek et al., 2012). Spatial and/or featural Gestalt grouping effects 
were thus not needed to eliminate competition, pointing again towards the idea that temporal 
integration by itself afforded a coherent representation. 
 The observers were sensitive, at some level of processing, to the loss of temporal 
information associated with trials in which they incorrectly ordered the targets, and produced lower 
PAS scores in these cases. It is therefore interesting to note that a similar loss of order information 
during temporal integration (i.e., everything appears more or less simultaneous), was not 
experienced as equally unclear. To the observers, then, temporal confusion was only a factor 
between events; between separate T1s and T2s, not within events. When integration occurs, the 
impression of having seen a single stimulus is thus relatively strong. When a reversal occurs, it is 
conceivable that effects of prior entry play a role. Prior entry is the principle that attentional 
facilitation of a stimulus (in this case T2) causes it to be more strongly activated, and thereby to be 
perceived as having come first (Olivers, Hilkenmeier, & Scharlau, 2011; Shore, Spence, & Klein, 
2001). The current data suggest that observers do experience some uncertainty when this loss of 
order information occurs.  
Nevertheless, the relationship between our findings and measures of metacognitive 
sensitivity, bias or efficiency (Fleming and Lau, 2014), is not completely clear. In particular, 
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measures such as type 2 area under the ROC curve and metacognitive d’, are not directly applicable 
to the questions we are considering here. Such measures of metacognition consider how accurately 
confidence judgements reflect correct versus incorrect reporting. The comparisons we are making 
are not though typically about correct versus incorrect reporting. For example, a key comparison for 
us is between Integrations and Reversals; these are both incorrect responses, and thus their 
comparison does not naturally fit into the metacognitive sensitivity framework. Accordingly, the 
relationship between our findings and the classic measures of metacognition awaits further 
consideration. 
 More concretely, in terms of the STST framework (Bowman & Wyble, 2007; Wyble, 
Bowman, & Nieuwenstein, 2009), it could be argued that integration errors are characteristic of the 
“Single episode” pattern of token to type binding shown in figure 1, panel D. That is, the two types 
bind exclusively into a single token, with no order information represented. Under typical AB task 
contingencies, where an integrated percept is not a possible stimulus, the STST model assumes that 
this case would yield a 50-50 guess at the order of types at report. This, for example, is the readout 
employed in (Bowman & Wyble, 2007) to model letters-in-digits tasks. However, in the experiment 
reported here, an integrated percept is a possible stimulus, and thus, we propose, would be reported 
as such in preference to an order guess. Additionally, STST would suggest that errors recorded as 
reversals in this paper, would be generated from a combination of “Pure order” and “Impure order” 
errors, c.f. Figure 1 panel B and panel C, respectively. In the former of these, only the second target 
gets bound to token one, and only the first to token two. Consequently, the “Pure order” case could 
be considered full prior entry, while “Impure order” might be considered a partial prior entry. In 
particular, in the “Impure order” error case, the bindings of one or more targets is “smeared across” 
two tokens. As previously stated, dependent upon the relative activation strengths of T1 and T2, 
both “Pure” and “Impure” order error outcomes can arise from STST. 
 Importantly, it has been argued that association of episodic contexts (in our setting, 
tokens) is an important foundation for metacognitive reflection (Pasquali, Timmermans, & 
Cleeremans, 2010). That is, the ability to reflect on our own thoughts, which has been argued to be 
central to our capacity to subjectively experience (c.f. Higher Order Theories of Thought; Lau & 
Rosenthal, 2011), requires episodic structuring of experiences, to know when, where, and in most 
general terms, in what context those experiences occurred. Just such introspection is at the heart of a 
subjective visibility judgement, suggesting that something like a bound token may serve as a unit of 
perceptual experience. Thus, it might be argued that the unambiguous association of types (which 
are STSTs representations of experiences) to tokens would yield high subjective visibility, while 
ambiguous bindings would yield low subjective visibility. 
 From this standpoint, STST would explain our key finding by arguing that, all else equal, 
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the “Perfect performance” (Figure 1A), “Pure order error” (Figure 1B) and “Single episode” (Figure 
1D) outcomes would all yield relatively high subjective visibility, since type-token associations are 
unambiguous. However, the “Impure order error” (Figure 1C) outcome would yield a low 
subjective visibility. Thus, the lower visibility for Reversals may be attributed to the prevalence of 
“Impure order error” outcomes, that is, the association to a type may be “smeared” across multiple 
tokens. 
 Conceptually, this STST interpretation is consistent with the notion that the role of tokens 
is to associate an episodic property to each individual item/ type, and when that individuation 
breaks down (as reflected by smearing across tokens) a subjectively anomalous experience is 
generated. 
 The STST model also fits well with our final analysis; see Figure 6, in which we showed 
that correct R2 responses were associated with higher T1 PAS scores than incorrect R2 responses. 
This finding is suggestive of the reciprocal relationship between T1 bottom-up trace strength and 
the attentional blink (Bowman, Wyble, Chennu, & Craston, 2008). The reciprocal relationship 
states that stronger T1s, which should presumably elicit higher PAS scores, encode faster and thus 
delay T2 encoding less. As a result, when T1 is strong, T2s encode more successfully and the blink 
is attenuated. This reciprocal relationship is in direct contrast to T1-T2 competition theories, such 
as, resource sharing (Shapiro, Schmitz, Martens, Hommel, & Schnitzler, 2006), interference theory 
(Shapiro, Raymond, & Arnell, 1997) and, indeed, the Global Workspace, as originally conceived 
(Dehaene et al., 2003). All of these would suggest a proportional relationship between T1 strength 
and the AB; that is, they suggest that a stronger T1 would suppress the T2 more. As discussed in 
(Bowman et al., 2008) and consistent with what is found here, typically in the literature a reciprocal 
relationship is observed. 
 Lastly, our results might also be interpreted as suggesting that integration and reversal of 
targets are different processes happening at different processing stages. In fact, the STST model and 
most of the other computational models of the attentional blink (and of its relation to conscious 
experience) included two or more stages of computation, with the early ones dedicated to feature 
extraction and target identification, and the later to target memorization and conscious access to 
target information (Bowman & Wyble, 2007; Chun & Potter, 1995; Dehaene et al., 2003; Raffone 
& Pantani, 2010; Raffone, Srinivasan, & van Leeuwen, 2014; Simione et al., 2012; Wyble et al., 
2009). In such models, in the early levels, all the stimuli are processed in parallel, whereas in the 
later levels some competitive or time-locked mechanisms are implemented. In light of our results, it 
might be argued that integration occurs in the early processing stages, leading to the formation of 
only one integrated representation that results in a clearer and sharper experience of such a temporal 
event, and also a single combined representation entering a token. It thereby seems that illusions of 
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integration in RSVP are subjectively impenetrable; they cannot be distinguished from (Both 
Correct) non-illusory percepts on the basis of assessment of the strength of conscious experience. 
By contrast, target reversal should occur at later stages of processing, with the formation of two 
distinct but wrongly ordered memory representations, with the consequence that the two events are 
experienced as most confused or “entangled”. 
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